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FOUR REFORMS
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
What follows are my top four suggestions for judicial action and advocacy that can result in urgently
needed and readily achievable reforms. As the American Judicature Society and its members consider
their agenda and mission for the coming years, each of these issues deserves their support.
by BARRY SCHECK

It is a considerable challenge, a
distinct privilege, and no doubt a
fool's errand to survey the past one
hundred years in the field of criminal justice with the purpose of identifying trends and key issues that
will critically challenge jurists who
are concerned with reforming the
system. I cannot pretend to possess

a legal historian's breadth of knowledge and remain a prisoner of my
own professional and personal experience. That experience instructs,
above all else, to be wary of observer
bias. So it's best to make important
aspects of that experience manifest
from the beginning and warn that the
views expressed here are entirely my

own and should not be taken as the
official position of any organization
with which I am associated.
I began practicing criminal law in
1975 as a Legal Aid lawyer (public
defender) in the South Bronx, inspired
by the civil rights movement and the
landmark criminal justice rulings of
the Warren Court. At that time, New
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York City was experiencing a financial crisis: The Association of Legal
Aid Attorneys had formed a union and
was striking to assure that lawyers
had access to telephones, office space,
vertical representation (the right to
represent clients from arrest to disposition), and that some limitations
were put on caseloads, which were
spiraling out of control. The process
of "early case assessment" had just
begun-screening by a bureau of
district attorneys of the initial statements from officers and witnesses,
case severity (breaking down nonviolent felonies to misdemeanors),
and case strength. This was just the
first salvo in a trend over the next
three decades that shifted initial
access to information and assessment
of cases for purposes of early plea bargaining and setting of bail away from
judges and into a domain more exclusively supervised by prosecutors. The
crack cocaine epidemic was nascent
and the movement towards determinant sentencing and mandatory
minimums was taking hold, again signaling the coming shift in the power
over sentencing away from judges to
prosecutors. Charles E. Silberman's
sweeping and insightful overview of
the system in 1980, Criminal Violence,
Criminal Justice,1 perfectly captured
the era and holds up to this day.
By the time I began teaching law,
practicing in federal courts, and
helping construct in-house clinical
programs that trained both prosecutors and defense attorneys (1979),
1 was inhabiting a world without
federal sentencing guidelines, cell
phones, personal computers, or the
internet, much less DNA technology, sophisticated neuroimaging, or
the crunching of "big data." I have
been fortunate to have a diverse
practice and participated in heavily
publicized proceedings including
civil rights suits against both police
departments and prosecutors. I have
defended clients, in state and federal
court, at trials and on appeal, who
were accused of a myriad of crimes. 2
Perhaps most important of all, for
the past 24 years, I have been lucky
enough to be part of the "innocence
movement" and to work intimately
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with a collection of lawyers (defense
and prosecution), judges, scholars,
and scientists who have litigated,
adjudicated, and studied an unprecedented wave of "exonerations" based
on DNA tests and other new evidence
of innocence.
So having quickly summarized my
experience and potential observational bias, what follows are my top
four suggestions for judicial action
and advocacy that can result in
urgently needed and readily achievable reforms. As the American Judicature Society and its members
consider its agenda and mission
for the coming years, each of these
issues deserves support.

Lead on Indigent Defense Reform
In this 50th anniversary year of the
Gideon 3 decision, there is no area

of criminal justice reform that has
made less progress over the last
century or is more significant for
improving the system than the right
to counsel. Without adequate counsel
for the poor one cannot even begin to
effectuate meaningful solutions to
the debilitating problems posed by
mass incarceration, over-criminalization, and racial bias. "Problemsolving courts," whether targeting
drugs, juveniles, family violence, or
communities, work best when there
are quality defense teams (not just
lawyers, but investigators, paralegals, and social workers) who
can counsel clients and their families "holistically." Strong indigent
defense does not just provide assurance the innocent are protected and
abuses by the state are exposed, but
holds families together, helps addicts
stay sober, keeps young offenders
in school, facilitates re-entry from
prison, and supports public safety
in communities.4 Viewed from this
perspective, indigent defense reform
is a cause that should, and still can,
garner bipartisan political support
and appeal across class and racial
divides.
But indigent defense remains the
neglected stepchild of the criminal
justice system. 5 It lacks a natural
base, a core constituency with legislative influence-poor people charged
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with crimes, often disenfranchised
by criminal convictions, and disproportionately from racial minorities,
have limited political power in the
first place. And there is a vicious cycle
at work as well-the worse the representation of institutional defenders and court-appointed counsel, the
less the community wants to rally for
a larger defender budget or higher
counsel fees. Nothing erodes respect
for our criminal justice system more
than the widespread conventional
wisdom that one is better off being
rich, white, and guilty than poor,
black or brown, and innocent.
As David Cole has pointed out,
"[a]t least every five years since
Gideon was decided, a major study
has been released finding that indigent defense is inadequate."6 There
are good reasons, however, on this
50th anniversary of Gideon to see
this ongoing crisis in funding adequate indigent defense as reaching
a qualitatively different breaking
point. One reason is the phenomenon
of "mass incarceration" in the United
States. As we approach a million new
felony convictions per year, it must
be emphasized that without anything
close to a corresponding allocation
of resources to the indigent defense
function, there has been a six-fold
increase in incarceration rates over
the past 30 years, going from 100
to almost 700 incarcerated persons
per 100,000 people, "a percentage
unprecedented in American history
and among industrialized nations." 7
1. New York, NY: Vintage Press 1980.
2. These crimes include murder, narcotics
distribution, organized crime activities, child
abuse, domestic and foreign "terrorism" cases,
as well as crime victims whose testimony was
essential to making high profile state and federal
prosecutions.
3. Gideon v. Wainwright 372 US 335 (1963) .
4. See Robin G. Steinberg, Beyond Lawyering: How Holistic Representation Makes for Good
Policy, Better Lawyers, and More Satisfied Clients,
30 NYU REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 625 (2005-2006).
5. For a blistering but all too accurate reflection on Gideon's anniversary, see Stephen B.
Bright, Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and
Resistance After Gideon V. Wainwright, forthcom ing at 122 YALE L.J. -- (2013).
6. David Cole, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND
CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 64 (Mankato, MN: The New Press 2000).
7. Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense
Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1595.
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A second reason is growing recognition that while innocent people do
plead guilty to felonies, the innocent
confess in much greater numbers to
misdemeanors 8 without the benefit
of counsel who are funded to conduct
independent investigations, if they
get counsel.9 There has always been a
tendency toward "the process being
the punishment" in misdemeanor
courts 10 -pieas of time served for
those who cannot make bail or who
come back to court numerous times
to get a trial on the merits-but with
the advent of "broken windows"
policing policies the number of misdemeanor prosecutions has dramatically risen.11 "It is time," Gerald
Kogan, former Chief Justice of the
Florida Supreme Court recently
observed, "to end the wasteful and
harmful practices that have turned
our misdemeanor courts into mindless conviction mills." 12
Steve Hanlon, for many years a
partner at Holland & Knight and
current chair of the ABA's Defense
Advisory Group to the Standing
Committee on Indigent Defense and
Legal Aid, summarizes the situation
with empathy for all, but with unvarnished realism:
Despite the heroic, indeed Sisyphean
efforts of individual public defenders,
the harsh truth is that every day in
thousands of courtrooms across this
nation, public defenders "meet 'em
and plead 'em," spending precious

8. See John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm,
The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty 16-17 (Cornell Legal
Studies Research Paper 2012), http://ssrn .co m/
abstract=2103787 ("(l]nnocent persons charged
with relatively minor offenses often plead guilty
in order to get out of jail, to avoid the hassle
of having criminal charges hanging over their
heads, or to avoid being punished for exercising
their right to trial."); see also When the Innocent
Plead Guilty, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
Content/When_the_lnnocent_Plead_Guilty.p hp,
last accessed June 1, 2013.
9. Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent
Def., Gideon's Broken Promise: America's Continuing Quest for Equal Justice, AM. BAR Ass'N
(2004), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
lega l_aid_i ndigent_defendants/initiatives/i ndigent_defense_ systems_improvement/gideons_
broken_promise.html.
10. Malcom M. Feeley, THE PRO CESS Is THE
PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (New York, NY: Russell Sage 1979).
11. Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter,
45 UC DAVIS L. REV. 277, 282 (2011).
12. Id., at 279.

Gideon v. Wainwright,
a landmark Warren
Court decision,
guaranteed indigent
defendants counsel in
state courts.

"Mr. Gideon, I am sorry,
but I cannot appoint Counsel
to represent you in this case.
Under the laws of the State of
Florida, the only time a Court can
appoint Counsel to represent a
Defendant is when that person is
charged with a capital offense.
I am sorry, but I will have to deny
your request to appoint Counsel
to defend you in this case."
-Judge Robert McGrary of the Florida Court, 1961
WWW.AJ S.ORG
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few minutes with their clients, as
their offices triage cases by shifting
resources to higher-risk cases (e.g.,
homicides and sex offenses). And
every day in thousands of courtrooms
throughout this nation, prosecutors
secure uncounseled waivers of
counsel and uncounseled guilty
pleas from criminal defendants with
little education or understanding
about the criminal justice system,
especially the devastating collateral
effects of those very guilty pleas.
Indeed, a compelling argument
could be made that the principal
function of all of the players in the
criminal justice system with respect
to the invariably poor and largely
black and brown population appearing before them is to serve as a facilitator for the mass over-incarceration
of a nation that now incarcerates a
greater proportion of its population
than any other nation in the world.
This sad state of affairs is or should
be well known to all of our courts,
especially our state supreme courts,
most of them charged under their
state constitutions with a power of
general superintendence or equivalent responsibility over the entire
justice system in their states.
This is the legacy of our generation of judges, lawyers, governors,
and legislators, like it or not. This
happened on our watch. Our grandchildren will undoubtedly ask us how
and why this happened. 13

tural protection" for everyone's
rights, including those never prosecuted or arrested. 15
This formulation resonates with
lessons learned from the "innocence
movement" and wrongful conviction
cases. Take, for example, crime laboratory scandals. A series of largescale audits have now documented
that for decades forensic analysts
such as Fred Zain (West Virginia),
Joyce Gilchrist (Oklahoma), and Jim
Bolding (Houston, Texas) got away
with either 'dry Jabbing' (not doing
the tests at all-just giving results)
or making repeated and obvious
errors because the defender system
simply lacked the capacity to investigate and expose these problems. 16
Prosecutors, of course, must take
some responsibility for uncritically
accepting "structural" dysfunction
at crime laboratories despite the
fact that it helped "make" their cases
against defendants they believed
were guilty. The adversary system,
however, quite correctly assumes the
defense counsel ought to be the first
line of protection in exposing forensic error and misconduct so that the
judiciary can do something about it.
This breakdown in the adversary
system did not just lead to many convictions of the innocent and failure to
apprehend the guilty, but rendered
the courts incapable of knowing
there was not a valid factual basis for
innumerable guilty pleas and convictions after trial. The same analysis
applies to police and prosecutorial
misconduct-unchecked abuses of
the executive branch the defense
function is primarily responsible for
detecting.
Expect, along these same lines, a
new surge of "systemic ineffectiveness" lawsuits that will begin with
individual defense lawyers and/or
institutional defenders declaring
themselves "unavailable" to take
additional assignments because of
excessive caseloads or lack of investigative resources. As opposed to
previous large, affirmative class
actions that sought to invalidate
entire systems, litigation that begins
in this fashion can directly and
immediately rely on defenses firmly

The judiciary has a special responsibility to ensure indigent defense
systems are truly functional. That
responsibility can no longer be
deferred or abdicated on separationof-powers grounds, as has so often
happened over the past two decades,
in adjudicating "systemic ineffectiveness" litigation. On the contrary,
as Martin Guggenheim has recently
argued, the crisis has reached a point
where separation-of-powers considerations compel the opposite result. 14
When indigent defense funding is so
inadequate that lawyers cannot even
conduct investigations of cases on a
regular basis, the executive branch
accumulates too much unchecked
power to prosecute and to influence
the outcomes on grounds other than
the merits, and, as a consequence,
the judicial branch is denied its duty
to decide cases independently. This
argument views the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel as a "struc32 6 JUDICATIJRE
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grounded in state ethical rules as
well as "structural" state and federal
constitutional arguments.17 Dean
Norm Lefstein, probably our leading
authority on the indigent defense
issues in the United States, has just
written an Executive Summary and
Recommendations to accompany his
book, Securing Reasonable Caseloads:
Ethics and Law in Public Defense,
where he lays out a roadmap detailing exactly how and why these lawsuits can be brought successfully. 18
Former FBI Director and Federal
Judge William Sessions describes it
as a "wake up call for all of us, particularly for lawyers and judges who
have taken an oath that we will never
reject or ignore the causes of the
oppressed or defenseless." "For too
long," Judge Sessions acknowledges,
"we have tolerated, through ignorance or design, systems of indigent
defense that violate the Constitution, our own Rules of Professional
Conduct, and common standards of
human decency." 19
The way the Florida Supreme
Court just dealt with this issue in
Public Defender ofthe Eleventh judicial
District, et. al. v. Florida 20 is instructive, if not exemplary. The public
defender in the 11th Judicial District
filed motions in 21 cases certifying
a conflict of interest in each case,
claiming that excessive caseloads
13. Needed: A Cultural Revolution, http://www.
americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_
mag a zi ne_home/2013_vol_ 39 /vol_ 3 0_no_ 4 _
gideon/needed_a_cultural_revolution.html.
14. Martin Guggenheim, The People's Right to
a Well-Funded Indigent Defender System, 36 NYU
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 395 (2012).
15. Id., at 401.
16. See https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/
displayArticle.aspx?articleid=22698&AspxAuto
DetectCookieSupport=1, last accessed on June
4, 2013.
17. See State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La.
1993); State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm'n v.
Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592 (Mo. 2012); DeWolfe v.
Richmond, 2012 WL 10853 (Md. Jan. 4, 2012);
Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y.
2010); Stephen F. Hanlon, State Constitutional
Challenges to Indig ent Defense Systems, 75 Mo. L.
Rev. 751 (2010).
18. See Chapter 7, Executive Summary and
Recommendations to Securing Reasonable Caseloads, ava ilable at http://www.indigentdefense.
org.
19. Id., at vii.
20. Public Defender of the Eleventh Judicial
District, et. al. v. Florida No. SCl0-1349 (May
23. 2013).
21. Id., at 10.

caused by underfunding meant the
office could not carry out its legal and
ethical obligations to the defendants.
Florida Supreme Court, before reaching the merits, had to contend with a
new Florida statute where the legislature made clear that "[i]n no case
shall the court approve a withdrawal
by the public defender based solely
upon the inadequacy of funding
or excess workload." 2 1 Citing prior
cases where it granted compensation to counsel in excess of statutory
fee schedules under extraordinary
circumstances, the Court explicitly
embraced a separation-of-powers
argument as the basis for reaching
the systemic ineffectiveness issue:
"This doctrine of inherent judicial
power 'exists because it is crucial
to the survival of the judiciary as
an independent, functioning, and
coequal branch of government."22
It also rejected the argument that
courts should address the problem
on a piecemeal case-by-case basis as
"wasteful," "redundant," and "tantamount to applying a Band-Aid to
an open head wound." 23 Ultimately,
the Court held that, notwithstanding a clear legislative enactment to
the contrary, the public defender's
declaration of unavailability due to
excessive caseload would be upheld
upon a showing of "a substantial risk
that representation of [one] or more
clients will be materially limited
by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client." 24
Leaders of the judiciary should
not wait for systemic ineffectiveness cases to be brought to address
22. ld. , at 17.
23 . ld., at 25
24. Id., at 26.
25. See ABA Ten Principles of Public Defense
Delivery Systems (2002).
26. See ABA Eight Guidelines of Public Defense
Related to Excessive Workloads at 6 (2009).
27. See Deborah Leff and Melanca Clark, Doing
Justice to Gideon, 39 ABA HUMAN RIGHTS 7 (April
2013).
28. Id., at 9.
29. For example, it would be a good idea
for institutional defenders should to keep time
sheets so that they can make a better case
in requesting funds or documenting why they
cannot take additional cases in the context of
systemic ineffectiveness litigation. See Hanlon,
Supra n.13; Jenna Greene, Counting the Hours,
NAT'L L.J. 05/27/2013 .
30. 373 us 83 (1963).

the indigent crisis if they exercise,
directly or indirectly, pursuant to
state or local statutes, supervisory
authority over court-appointed
lawyer systems. Court-appointed
lawyer systems often serve more of
the indigent in a jurisdiction than
institutional defenders, but usually
lack a supervisory infrastructure
that does much more than ensure
attorneys are not improperly billing.
There are rarely, if ever, systematic
audits of other cases after courtappointed lawyers are found to be
ineffective in one matter; and there
are rarely, if ever, systematic audits
of lawyers who chronically fail to
seek appointment of experts, investigators, or visit incarcerated clients
to assess the quality of whatever
representation was provided. This
is simply unacceptable in a digital
age where the practical and financial
barriers to gathering and tracking
this kind of information have fallen
dramatically.
Before briefly commenting on
what the judges can do about courtappointed lawyer systems they
administer, it is important to emphasize, as AJS has long acknowledged,
that judges should not be in charge
of court-appointed lawyer systems
at all. The ABA's Ten Principles of
Public Defense Delivery Systems
makes clear that the public defense
function, including the selection,
funding, and payment of defense
counsel, be independent of the judiciary (Principle 1); that indigentdefense counsel should have a parity
of resources with the prosecution
(Principle 8); and defense counsel
should be supervised and systematically reviewed for quality and efficiency according to nationally and
locally adopted standards (Principle
10). 25 AJS co-sponsored the ABA Eight
Guidelines of Public Defense Related
to Excessive Workloads, which was
approved by the ABA House of Delegates in 2009, including the commentary to Guideline 2 which reads,
"[t]he ABA endorses complete independence of the defense function,
in which the judiciary is neither
involved in the selection of counsel
or their supervision." 26 Nonetheless,

chief administrative judges who are
responsible court-appointed lawyer
systems should use their supervisory powers to create independent structures consistent with the
Ten Principles to oversee how the
system functions. The appointment
of special masters or commissioners
would be one mechanism; outreach
to law schools, independent committees of state bar associations,
or appropriate nonprofits could be
another.
In terms of securing funding and
resources, judges should not only
support indigent defense reform
within their states but also assist
the defense community in getting
its fair share of federal funding.
The Department of Justice (DOJ)
is actively soliciting proposals to
assist states and localities improve
the quality of indigent defense services including innovative data
collection to assess the quality of
court-appointed counsel. 27 Most
importantly, DOJ wants the defense
community to have a seat at the
table and be a beneficiary of "block"
grants through the Edward Byrne
Memorial Justice Assistance Grant
Program, its largest grant program;
it allocated nearly $300 million
to states and localities in 2012. 28
Judges should use their influence
to make that a reality, not an empty
promise.
In short, judges simply have to
lead and be proactive, even forcing
the defense community to change its
culture and take steps it resists, like
keeping timesheets, so that it can
get a fair share of resources. 29 The
enhancement of indigent defense is
the linchpin reform that makes all
other improvements in the criminal
justice system achievable. It should
be the judiciary's highest priority
and certainly an area that would
benefit from the support of AJS.

Issue "Ethical Rule" Orders and
Enforce Them Through Contempt
Citations
On this 100th anniversary of AJS and
the 50th anniversary of Bradyv. Maryland, 30 I would ask AJS to consider
advocating for the simple proposal
WWW.AJS .ORG
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I have put forward with the Hon.
Nancy Gertner. 31 We call it the
"ethical rule" order, and, given its
simplicity, we hope judges will come
to view it as an Occam's razor for the
disclosure of exculpatory information. Every state and federal judge
in the United States has the authority to issue an "ethical rule" order
now. It is founded upon state ethical
rules binding state prosecutors and
forms the basis of local federal court
rules governing federal prosecutors.
Judges do not have to wait for a new
statute to be passed, a new regulation to be promulgated, or even a
motion from defense counsel-it
can and, I would argue, should be a
standing order. Ethical prosecutors
ought be receptive because it provides clarity to a disclosure obligation that has remained unnecessarily
murky for decades.
Forty-nine states, Guam, the
United States Virgin Islands, and the
District of Columbia, all have adopted
a version of ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 (Special
Responsibilities of a Prosecutor)3 2
that requires prosecutors to disclose,
pre-trial, all evidence that "tends to
negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense." 33 The ABA has
made it plain that this disclosure obligation is "separate from and broader
than the Brady constitutional standards."34 Viewed from a pre-trial
perspective, the Brady constitutional
standard covers a) information that
a prosecutor knows or should know
about (including information in law
enforcement files that the prosecutor
doesn't personally possess), 35 and b)
information that an appellate court,
post conviction, would regard as so
important ("material") that failure
to disclose it requires a reversal and
a new trial. 36 Plainly, as many have
observed, this "constitutional" obligation is not particularly helpful to
anyone trying to comply pre-trialbe it the prosecutor, defense counsel,
or the court wondering whether
something is 'Brady.' It was for this
very reason the ABA devised Rule
3.8(d) to be unambiguously broad:
Rule 3.B(d) requires a prosecutor
to "make timely disclosure to the
328 JUDICAllJRE
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defense of all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends
to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense, and, in connec-

tion with sentencing, [to] disclose
to the defense and to the tribunal
all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor." 37 At

31. See "How to Rein In Rogue Prosecutors: What
Happened to Ted Stevens Will Keep Happening
to Ordinary Americans Unless Judges Change the
Rules. " Wall Street Journal Op Ed, March 15, 2012.
Judge Gertner has retired from federal bench
where she sat in the Northern District of Massachusetts and now teaches as a Professor of Practice at Harvard Law School. She is also of counsel
to Neufeld, Scheck, and Brustin, a civil rights law
firm . Another version of this reform proposal will
appear in a forthcoming issue of The Champion, a
publication of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, so hopefully judges who do
not issue standing ethical rule orders can expect
motions requesting them.
32. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof'!
Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009). California is the only state that has not adopted
attorney ethics codes that are substantially
similar to the ABA Model Rule. David Keenan,
Deborah Jane Cooper, David Lebowitz & Tamar
Lerer, The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability
after Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect
Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L. J.
ONLINE 203, 222. California has its own ethical

rules that differ substantially from the Model
Rule and that do not have an equivalent to the
ABA Model Rule. Id., at 222, n. 95. However, California's Rules of Professional Conduct address
certain important aspects of a prosecutor's professional duties including a rule regarding suppression of evidence. Id. (citing CAL. R. PRoF'L
CONDUCT 5-100 ("Threatening Criminal, Administrative, or Disciplinary Charges"); R. 5-120
("Trial Publicity"); R. 5-200 ("Suppression of
Evidence"); R. 5-300 ("Contact with Officials");
R. 5-310 ("Prohibited Contact with Witnesses");
R. 5-320 ("Contact with Jurors").
33 . MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
3.8 (1983). For updated version, see http://
www . am er i can bar. or g /groups/pro fe ss ion a l_res pons i bi Ii ty /p u bl i cations/
model _rules_of_professional_conduct/model _
r u Ies _ of _profession a I_conduct _tab I e _of_
contents.html.
34. Amicus Brief of ABA at 1, Smith v. Cain, No.
10-8145 (U.S . August 19, 2011).
35. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995);
See also Smith v. Cain, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 576, 575
36. Supra n. 27 at 87.
37. Supra n. 33.
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the same time, it provides an escape
clause for in camera production when
timely disclosure could endanger a
witness or otherwise unfairly prejudice the prosecution before trial. 38
Accordingly, an "ethical order"
should be very straightforward: It
should track the relevant ethical rule
of the jurisdiction and direct a prosecutor to search her file and verify
that she has disclosed all information that "tends to negate the guilt of
the accused or mitigates the offense."
If there is a relevant police file, the
order could also direct a search of it
and a similar disclosure. The order
could also request the prosecutor
to disclose, on the record or reduce
to writing, all favorable oral statements she discovers when interviewing witnesses. Again, tracking
the ethical rule, the order should
include a safe-harbor provision that
allows the prosecutor to delay disclosure by making an in camera ex parte
production of the information and a
showing of "good cause," such as real
evidence that witnesses are at risk or
perjury will be suborned. The order
should also provide for in camera
ex parte production of information
when the prosecutor is uncertain
about whether it tends to negate
guilt or mitigate punishment.
When the ethical rule order should
be issued is a question that may turn,
to some extent, on the practices of
a jurisdiction and local statutes. If
there is, by custom or statute, "open
file" discovery or disclosure of prior
statements by witnesses before

38. See Id., at 3 (1983). Massachusetts has
provided specific guidance in its rules of professional conduct, stating that "[i]f the disclosure
of privileged or prejudicial information is necessary, the lawyer shall make an application
to withdraw ex parte to a judge other than the
judge who will preside at the trial and shall seek
to be heard in camera". MASS. R. PROF'L CONDUCT
3.3 (2013). http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/rpc3.
htm#Rule%203.3.
39. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622,
633 (2002). Please note, however, that Ruiz
should not be read as allowing "material" proof
of innocence to be withheld. See also Green,
Federal Criminal Discovery Reform: A Legislative
Approach, 64 MERCER L. REV. 639, at 648-49
(April 2013) for an insightful discussion on the
conflict between the right of the defense to
early disclosure of favorable evidence and the
prosecutor 's statutory authority to withhold
impeachment evidence.

*****************************
WE HOPE JUDGES WILL COME TO
VIEW ETHICAL RULE ORDERS AS AN
OCCAM'S RAZOR FOR THE DISCLOSURE
OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE.

*****************************
they testify at trial, then it will be
easier to issue the order early in the
process with a caveat that disclosure
of favorable evidence is a continuing
obligation. There may be resistance
to issuance of the order very early
in the processing of a case, particularly before an early guilty plea, on
the grounds that the prosecutor may
not be familiar at that point with
everything in her file or the relevant
police files, and there is no constitutional requirement to disclose mere
impeachment material to a grand
jury or before a guilty plea. 39
Finally, the order should clearly
state that "willful and deliberate
failure to comply" is punishable by
contempt. This provision is very
important and carefully worded. It
means that negligent, inexperienced,
stupid, even reckless prosecutors
will not be held in contempt. But
frankly, given the mens rea requirements in most jurisdictions and the
realities of criminal practice, the
only prosecutors who should be held
in contempt for violating the ethical
rule order are those who do so willfully and deliberately. Based on
discussions with leaders in the prosecutorial community and the judiciary, we think there is widespread
agreement that the handful of prosecutors who deliberately and willfully
suppress favorable evidence, even
in "harmless error" cases, should be
sanctioned for purposes of deterrence alone. It is the repeat offender,
· the prosecutor who routinely makes
untimely disclosure of Brady material in the middle of trial, or is caught

more than once hiding evidence that
is plainly exculpatory, who is most at
risk of being sanctioned.
Prosecutors may be startled at
first upon seeing the ethical rule
motion as opposed to the usual,
general directive to turn over all
Brady/Kyles material, but upon
reflection, they should come to accept
and perhaps even welcome it as a salutary measure that helps train new
prosecutors and identifies the 'bad
apples' who bring discredit to the
profession. Moreover, what can they
credibly say in opposition? The State
doesn't recognize the ethical rule,
invariably a state statutory obligation, as binding? The State doesn't
believe it is right or fair to be ordered
to obey an ethical rule that is clear
and broad as opposed to the "constitutional" Brady obligation that is
ambiguous and narrow? Or, the State
doesn't want to be ordered to follow
the ethical rule because a violation
later deemed to be knowing, deliberate, and malicious could result in a
contempt proceeding, civil or criminal, and possibly bar discipline?
A more likely and politick response
would be: Trust us; when following our constitutional obligation to
turn over all Brady/Kyles material,
the State will meet its ethical obligation to disclose all information that
"negates guilt or mitigates punishment." The problem with that argument, however, is that it concedes
that the ethical rule should be followed. Judges should explain that an
order mandating the enforcement
of the State's ethical rule is not a
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personal accusation against a particular prosecutor or office, but a
principled position to address what
we now know to have happened
too often. Brady/Kyles violations do
happen; scores of innocent people
have been convicted by those violations. This is not to say the prosecutorial misconduct is epidemic,
but it seems fair to characterize it
as more than episodic. The following footnote contains just some of
the recent cases, press reports, and
law review articles highlighting the
Brady abuses that have influenced
public discourse. 40 And even if one
were to assume prosecutorial misconduct and the suppression of Brady
material is just episodic, exaggerated
by media exposes, or limited to just
a few outlier jurisdictions, that's all
the more reason to applaud ethical
rule orders as a way to bolster public
confidence in the integrity of the
process.
Some readers may be wondering at this point where the idea for
the ethical rule order came from
and whether there is any evidence
it will work. Two high-profile Brady
cases provide an answer-the collapse of the prosecution of Senator
Ted Stevens in Washington, D.C., and
the Michael Morton exoneration in
Texas.
Former Alaskan Senator Ted
Stevens was indicted and found
guilty of receiving benefits and other
things of value from VECO Corporation, Bill Allen, the VECO CEO, and
two other individuals; concealing
receipt of such benefits; and failing
to disclose receipt of such benefits on
annual Financial Disclosure Forms. 41
The Department of Justice moved to
set aside the verdict and to dismiss
the indictment with prejudice when
DOJ attorneys discovered during
post-trial litigation "significant,
undisclosed Brady/Giglio information in prosecutors' notes of statements by the government's principal
witness, Bill Allen."42 The presiding
U.S. District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan granted the DOJ's motion and
dismissed the indictment with prejudice, and, on the same day, appointed
Henry F. Schuelke III "to investigate
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and prosecute such criminal co'ntempt proceedings as may be appropriate" against the six prosecutors
who conducted the investigation and
trial of Senator Stevens. 43 Schuelke
found "evidence that compels the
conclusion, and would prove beyond
a reasonable doubt," that Joseph
Bottini and James Goeke, both assistant U.S. attorneys in the Alaska
U.S. Attorney's Office, "intentionally
withheld ... Brady information from
the attorneys for Senator Stevens."44
However, Schuelke did not recommend prosecution of Bottini and
Goeke for criminal contempt because

*

all Brady/Giglio information in their
possession. In large part, this was
because of representations made by
prosecutors to the Court that such an
order was unnecessary. 45

[a]lthough the evidence establishes
that this misconduct was intentional,
the evidence is insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
Mr. Bottini and Mr. Goeke violated the
criminal contempt statute, 18 U.S.C. §
401, which requires the intentional
violation of a clear and unambiguous order. Although a reading of the
transcripts of numerous hearings
and proceedings before and during
the trial establish that Judge Sullivan intended that all Brady and
Giglio material be produced, none of
the orders issued by Judge Sullivan,
before or during the trial, specifically
directed the prosecutors to disclose

When the issue was raised, Judge
Sullivan indicated that he would
just "issue an order as a general
reminder to the government of its
daily ongoing obligation to produce
[Brady] material" and state that he
was "convinced that the government
in its team of prosecutors is thoroughly familiar with the decisions
from our Circuit and from my colleagues on this Court, and that they,
in good faith, know that they have
an obligation, on an ongoing basis
to provide the relevant, appropriate
information to defense counsel to
be utilized in a usable format as that
information becomes known or in
possession of the government.''46
In stark contrast to the Stevens
case, Michael Morton's 1987 wrongful conviction for murdering his wife
also involved numerous Brady violations, but it was preceded by a specific motion and direct court order to
turn over all reports and notes of the
lead investigator, Sgt. Don Wood, for

40. The two highly publicized Supreme
Court cases, Connick v. Thompson 563 US __ _
(2011) and Smith v. Cain 565 US __ (2010),
both involved significant and disturbing fail ures to disclose exculpatory information to
the defense in Orleans Parish as required in
Kyles v. Whitley, the landmark Brady case, (373
U.S. 83 (1963)), of the modern era that also
originated in Orleans Parish. In Ellen Yaroshefsky's examination of changes to the Brady
policies of the New Orleans District Attorney's
Office post-Kyles, she found disclosure violations persist for reasons that are not necessarily unique to the jurisdiction. See Ellen
Yaroshefsky, New Orleans Prosecutorial Disclosure in Practice After Connick v. Thompson,
ZS GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 913, 913, 914-915 and
917 (2012). After noting that former Alaska
Senator Ted Stevens's guilty verdict on corruption charges was thrown out following revelations that the prosecutors had withheld crucial
evidence, the trial court "ultimately instructed
the jury that the DOJ lawyers had failed to
meet their obligation to disclose evidence to
the defendants." In response to another federal
prosecutor's disclosure violation, a U.S . Chief
District Judge of Massachusetts initiated disciplinary proceedings a nd the court's opinion
summarized "close to 70 published federal
court decis ions involving federal prosecutors'
nondisclosure or belated disclosure of discovery material." Bruce Green concluded "it seems
only logical to assume that the cases of disclosu re error that have surfaced are just the tip of
the iceberg, given how difficult it is to discover
such errors after-the-fact." Bruce A. Green,

Beyond Training Prosecutors about their Disclosure Obligations: Can Prosecutors' Offices Learn
from their Lawyers' Mistakes?, 31 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2161, 2161-2162 and 2175 (2010) . The
Veritas Initiative concluded in a comprehensive 2010 report that Brady violations are
among the most pervasive forms of prosecutorial mi sconduct. Kathleen M. Ridolfi & Maurice
Passley, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA
1997-2009, (2010) http ://www.veritasinitiative.org/our-work/prosecutorial-misconduct/
p m-p reven table-error- a- rep or t-o n-prose cu torial-misconduct-in-california/. USA Today
conducted an investigation of federal prosecutorial misconduct and published a series of
articles in 2010 discussing the lack of repercussions for prosecutors that engage in prosecutorial misconduct and highlighted numerous
cases involving Brady violations. (Brad Heath
and Kevin McCoy, Prosecutor misconduct lets
convicted off easy, USA TODAY, Dec. 28, 2010,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/j udicial/2010-12-2 8-1 Aprosecutorpunish 28 _CV_N .htm). This list could continue for
several pages; these are just a few examples.
41. Report to Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan of Investigation Conducted Pursuant to the Court's
Order, dated April 7, 2009 at 2, In re Special
Proceedings, No. 09 -0198 (EGS) (D. D.C. Nov. 14,
2011).
42 . Id., at 32.
43. Id., at 1.
44. Id., at 28.
45. Id., at 29 (emphasis added) .
46. Id., at 30-31.
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Sixth Ame11dme11t
In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed,
which district shall have been
previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence
COMSTOCK

in camera Brady review. 47 Ken Anderson, then Williamson County District Attorney and now a Williamson
County Superior Court Judge, was
asked point blank by the trial court
before the trial if he had "any information favorable to the accused," and
he replied, "No, sir."
In fact, more than two decades
after the trial, when post-conviction
DNA tests on a bloody bandana left
near the point of exit exonerated
Morton and identified the real perpetrator, undisclosed exculpatory
evidence was discovered in Sgt.
Wood's files through an open record
47. Report to Court of Michael W. Morton at 3,
State of Texas v. Michael W. Morton, No. 86-452K26 (26th Dist. Ct. Tex. Dec. 19, 2011).
48. Id., at 16-18.
49. The Court of Inquiry, Article 52 .08 of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is like a public
grand jury or preliminary hearing except that
it allows a private citizen to produce credible
evidence before a court of general jurisdiction
that the laws of Texas have been violated. It is
ava il able by design for private parties to bring
actions against pubic officials, including prosecutors, who might otherwise not be investigated
and charged for political reasons . Hence, there
are three judicial findings necessary by three
different judges before an arrest warrant can
iss ue and a tri al held before yet a fourth judge.
(http:// w w w. s ta tu tes .leg is.state. tx. us/ Docs/
CR/htm/CR.52.htm).

act request. These exculpatory documents included a transcript of a taped
interview between Wood and Morton's mother-in-law, Rita Kirkpatrick, where she described Morton's
three-and-a-half-year-old son Eric
saying he had witnessed the murder.
Eric provided a detailed, chilling
account of how a "monster" with
"red gloves" beat his mother, and he
offered a number of detailed observations that precisely corroborate
the crime scene and the manner of
the victim's death. When Kirkpatrick
advised Sgt. Wood to stop looking at
her son-in-law as the murderer and
to go after the "monster," Sgt. Wood
speculated that Eric didn't recognize
his own father because Morton was
disguised. He then asked Kirkpatrick
to keep what she had heard confidential.
There was also a report recounting statements made by a neighbor of
Morton right after the murder noting
that the neighbor had observed,
on several occasions, "a male park
a green van on the street behind
[the Mortons's] address, then the
subject would get out and walk into
the wooded area off the road" as if

he were casing the place for a home
invasion. This "green van" report
clearly supported Morton's theory
of defense that someone had entered
the house to commit a burglary from
the wooded area after Morton left for
work in the morning and then murdered Christine Morton, who was
sleeping. 48
Notwithstanding the order for
in camera Brady inspection of Sgt.
Wood's file and a direct inquiry by the
court about the existence of exculpatory evidence, neither the "Kirkpatrick" statement nor the "green van"
report were submitted to the trial
judge or disclosed to defense counsel,
even though versions of those documents were in both Sgt. Wood's file
and Anderson's trial file.
Taking advantage of an unusual
Texas procedure, the Court of
Inquiry, 49 Morton's defense team
produced sworn testimony and evidence obtained in Morton's postconviction habeas proceeding to
make a probable cause showing that
Ken Anderson had violated the laws
of Texas by suppressing exculpatory
in the Morton prosecution. Judge Sid
Harle made the first probable cause
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finding under the Court of Inquiry
procedure. The chief judge accepted
the finding and appointed Judge
Lewis Sturm to review the evidence
and determine whether Judge Anderson should be arrested and tried.
After a five-day evidentiary
hearing, on April 19, 2013, 27 years
after Morton was convicted, Judge
Ken Anderson was arrested in the
Williamson County Courthouse and
charged with Criminal Contempt,
Texas Government Code § 21.002(a),
Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence, Texas Penal Code §
37.09; and Tampering with Government Records, Texas Penal Code §
37.10. 50
Whatever the outcome of criminal or the state bar charges against
Judge Anderson, the impact of the
Morton Court of Inquiry in Texas has
been significant. John Bradley, Ken
Anderson's protege and successor as
Williamson County District Attorney, was not re-elected. The "Michael
Morton" discovery reform law was
passed by the Republican controlled
Texas legislature on May 13, 2013, on
the 50th anniversary of Brady, with
support from District Attorney's
Association and the Texas Criminal
Defense Lawyers Association. The
Morton law expands discovery disclosure generally, and, most importantly, it adopts the ethical rule
standard-prosecutors must timely
disclose all information that "tends
to negate guilt or mitigate punishment" -an obligation that can easily
be converted into an ethical rule
order by state trial judges. 51 Another
law passed as a result of the Morton
case, the Prosecutor Accountability
Act, requires at least a public censure
if a prosecutor violates the ethics rule
requiring disclosure of exculpatory
evidence. 52 And many district attorneys in Texas are instituting "open
file" discovery policies, claiming it's
the best way to avoid Brady problems and to reassure the public they
are playing fairly. The take-home
message is that simply exposing a
'bad-apple' prosecutor for willful and
deliberate misconduct is not enough;
rather, a serious and rapid sanction
for even one 'bad apple' is what gets
332 JUDICATIJRE
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the criminal justice community, and
the political elites, to pay attention.
In the same fashion, the ethical
rule order will both generally and
specifically deter 'bad-apple' prosecutors because it is not subject to
many of the practical and procedural
hurdles that have obstructed punishment even for deliberate, intentional,
and malicious Brady violations.
Ordinarily, the remedy for a Brady
violation is the reversal of the conviction because the suppressed exculpatory evidence was "material." After
looking at the record, an appellate
court decides that the suppressed
evidence created a reasonable probability of a different outcome such
that confidence in the integrity of
the verdict is undermined. While
Brady was not about deterrence, 53
some believe that district attorneys,
embarrassed when a conviction is
reversed for withholding exculpatory evidence, will take ameliorative
steps. They will punish the offending prosecutor or, when no one was
at fault, fix the systemic breakdown
that caused the failure to disclose in
the first place. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has relied on this justification in Imbler v. Pachtman 54 when it
established absolute immunity for
prosecutors from civil suits, insofar
as the prosecutor is functioning in an
adversarial, not investigative capac-

ity. 55 In a recent brief to the Supreme
Court, urging the further narrowing
of section 1983 liability for prosecutorial misconduct, the National
District Attorneys Association and
the Association of State Attorneys
General have underscored the deterrent value of the very threat of bar
discipline, criminal prosecution, and
political embarrassment.56
But even if some district attorneys
are taking such action when convictions are vacated, this approach does
nothing to identify district attorneys or individual prosecutors who
deliberately suppress exculpatory
evidence in "harmless error" cases.
Cases involving obviously-guilty
defendants are not likely to engender much public outrage or impetus
for action. Those prosecutors will
escape public scrutiny and public
punishment. In contrast, the ethical
rule order offers a remedy through
which the defense bar can take direct
action against individual prosecutors who deserve to be sanctioned,
in front of the judge whose order was
violated.
Like the Morton case, and unlike
the Ted Stevens matter, violations of
an ethical rule order are more likely
to result in contempt citations, bar
discipline, or even criminal prosecution. It allows the judge who
issued the order to enforce it directly

50. It should be noted that Anderson may have
some success raising the statute of limitations
successfully as an affirmative defense to the
tampering charges, but that defense is unlikely
to defeat the Criminal Contempt allegation.
There may not even be a statute of limitations in
Texas for Criminal Contempt, or if there is one,
it runs from the time of discovery. Anderson is
also facing state bar ethics charges arising out
of the same conduct.
51. Texas Senate Bill 1611, unanimously
approved by the House on May 13, 2013, the
fiftieth anniversary of Brady, requires in Section
2(h) disclosure of "a ny exculpatory, impeachme nt, or mitigating document, item or information in the possession, custody or control
of the state that tends to negate the guilt of
the defendant or would tend to reduce punishment for the offense charged." (http://www.
capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/83R/billtext/html/
SB016111.htm).
52 . Texas Senate Bill 825 . (http://www.
legis. state.tx .us /tlodo cs /8 3 R/ b ii I text/ h tm I/
SB008251.htm).
53. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963);
supra n. 6., at 87.
54. 424 us 409 (1976).
55. "We emphasize that the immunity of prosecutors from liability in suits under s 1983

does not leave the public powerless to deter
misconduct or to punish that which occurs.
This Court has never suggested that the policy
considerations which compel civil immunity
for certain governmental officials also place
them beyond the reach of the criminal law. Even
judges, cloaked with absolute civil immunity
for centuries, could be punished criminally for
willful deprivations of constitutional rights on
the strength of 18 U.S.C. s 242, the criminal
analog of s 1983. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
503, 94 S. Ct. 669, 679, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974); cf.
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 627, 92 S.Ct.
2614, 2628, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972). The prosecutor would fare no better for his willful act.
Moreover, a prosecutor stands perhaps unique,
among officials whose acts could deprive
persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional discipline by an association
of his peers. These checks undermine the argument that the imposition of civil liability is the
only way to in sure that prosecutors are mindful
of the constitutional rights of persons accused of
crime." Imbler, at 428-429.
56. Brief for the National Association of Assistant United States Attorneys and National District Attorneys Assoication as Amicus Curiae
in support of Petitioners, at 14, Pottawatta mie
County v. McGhee (No. 08-1065).
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through a contempt citation without
having to wait for the prosecutor's
office to take action. Atthe same time,
since contempt has to be knowing
and deliberate, inexperienced, negligent, or ill-trained prosecutors will
not be sanctioned, thereby assuring
the legal community this remedy is
reserved for those who truly deserve
punishment. Moreover, a contempt
citation can be immediately appealed
and will surely generate some useful
precedent quickly. And, perhaps
most significantly, since contempt
is a continuing offense, the statute
of limitations in most states will not
bar prosecution or will run from the
time of discovery.
The Innocence Project will continually publish an online list of all
judges who grant ethical rule orders
so that they are immediately available
to all. Please inform us of any orders
or problems with this approach at
ethicalruleorder@innocenceproject.
org. And AJS could be instrumental in
persuading judges to adopt this practice. A model Ethical Rule Standing
Order, drafted by Judge Gertner, can
be found on page 335 of this issue of

Judicature.

Renovate Manson
Eyewitness identification remains
the leading cause of wrongful conviction of the innocent in the United
States. In the 307 post-conviction DNA exonerations that have
occurred in the United States since
1989, 57 inaccurate eyewitness testimony contributed to wrongful convictions in over 75 percent of those
cases. The Registry of Wrongful
Convictions, which reviews "nonDNA exonerations" as well as DNA
exonerations, and differentiates
between "mistaken" eyewitnesses
5 7. http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewi tness-M isidenti fication .php. last
accessed on June 3, 2013.
58. http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/ Pages/d etail list.a spx, last accessed June
3, 2013.
59. The field study achieved "random assignment" and yielded a rich set of results that will
lie of e normous benefit to the law e nforceme nt
for the remaining decade.
60. http ://theiacp.org/About/WhatsN ew/
tabid/459/?id=1951&v=l last accessed June 3,
2013 .

*****************************
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION REMAINS
THE LEADING CAUSE OF WRONGFUL
CONVICTION OF THE INNOCENT
IN THE UNITED STATES .

*****************************
and eyewitnesses who are lying, still
lists misidentification as the leading
cause. 58
In 2005-2006, a field study conducted in Illinois tested double-blind
sequential procedures versus traditional simultaneous lineup procedures. The methodology of the
Illinois study was widely criticized
and the validity of its results questioned. However, it still raised questions for some in law enforcement
about the effectiveness of procedural
reforms that no scientist was seriously questioning, including sequential lineups. As a consequence, AJS,
the Innocence Project, the John Jay
School of Criminal Justice, and the
Police Foundation did a field study
in four cities to resolve, among other
issues, the comparative utility of
sequential blind versus simultaneous
blind presentations. 59 This AJS field
study accelerated momentum among
law ·enforcement and state policy
makers to adopt eyewitness reforms
generally. In particular, the International Association of Chiefs of Police
(IACP) made "Wrongful Convictions"
its primary policy last year, culminating in a summit and issuance of an
exemplary set of policy recommendations on eyewitness identification
procedures as well as commitment to
training departments. 60
The AJS field study is not the only
support for reforming procedures.
Since the mid-1970s, experimental
psychologists have studied the psychological processes and reliability
of eyewitness memory and identification. Derived from laboratory
experiments, recommended proce-

dural reforms for conducting identification to improve the accuracy of
eyewitness identification include:
• Double-blind administration:
The person administering the lineup
does not know which individual is
the suspect;
• Cautionary instructions: Prior
to viewing the lineup, the witness is
instructed that the perpetrator may
or may not be in the lineup, that the
witness need not make an identification, and that the administrator does
not know which individual is the
suspect;
• Lineup composition and filler
selection: Persons, other than the
suspect, participating in the lineup
fit the general descriptions of the
perpetrator, and the suspect does
not unduly stand out from the nonsuspect fillers;
• Immediately after identification,
the witness is asked to describe his/
her certainty in making the identification.
• Sequential lineup presentation:
Lineup photographs are shown one
at a time, rather than all at once.
Whatever the pace of eyewitness
reforms-either implemented by
state and local law enforcement, voluntarily or legislatively requiredeyewitness identifications come to
courts for pre-trial assessment and,
if the case proceeds to trial, evaluation by juries. For this reason alone,
making sure courts appraise this
evidence with sophistication and in
accordance with good and established
scientific findings is critical. The aim
is not simply in spreading awareness of the extraordinary scientific
WWW .AJS .ORG
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advances in experimental psychology over the last 30 years, it is even
more important to develop a framework that makes sure the courts do
not lag too far behind the science
again, while also not getting too far
ahead of the data. Moreover, there
are good reasons to believe that
establishing a legal framework in
the area of eyewitness identification testimony can be an influential
example of how similar issues intersecting law and science can be adjudicated.
Two recent landmark decisions
in the area of eyewitness identification evidence, State v. Henderson in
New Jersey 6 1 and State v. Lawson in
Oregon, 62 have provided a blueprint
for state courts to re-evaluate and
revise their legal architecture for the
assessment and regulation of eyewitness testimony based on a comprehensive and in-depth assessment
of the findings from experimental
psychology that have occurred since
Manson v. Braithwaite 63 was decided
by the U.S. Supreme Court.
In Henderson, the New Jersey
Supreme Court undertook an
exemplary procedure that greatly
enhanced its adjudicative process.
It appointed a distinguished retired
judge, the Hon. Geoffery Gaulkin,
to serve as a special master and
conduct an extensive hearing about
the eyewitness identification science
and whether the Manson legal architecture was still "appropriate."64
Judge
Gaulkin's
comprehensive
"science" findings about the effect of
"system" and "estimator" variables 65
on eyewitness identification were
adopted almost without exception
by the Henderson Court and remain
an extremely valuable resource for
researchers and courts reviewing
these issues.
Relying on its supervisory powers
and on state constitutional grounds,
the Henderson Court rejected the
Manson balancing test (the balance of
"suggestive procedures" against five
"reliability factors") as scientifically
confounded for failing to take into
account how suggestive procedures
themselves and confirming feedback
can falsely inflate "reliability factors"
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based on witness self-reports (opportunity to observe, certainty, and
attention). The Court also faulted the
Manson test for ignoring the effect
of relevant estimator variables like
stress, lighting, and race, which can
and do affect reliability, unless an
identification procedure was found
to be impermissibly suggestive. 66
As remedies, the Henderson Court
proposed more extensive pre-trial
hearings, jury instructions reflecting
generally accepted scientific findings
about probable effects, motions in
limine, and use of experts. Of special
interest and importance are the postHenderson jury instructions that
were produced by a jury instruction
committee and ultimately approved
by the court. 67
The Lawson decision adopted Henderson's science findings and rejection of Manson, but grounded its
new legal architecture on the state
evidence code that, in turn, tracks
the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE).
This aspect of Lawson is significant
and will be helpful analytically for
both state and federal judges. An
evidence code framework is generally understood in state and federal
courts, and "evidentiary principles"
should not be conflated with "due
process concerns." Last term, in
Perry v. New Hampshire, the Supreme
Court held that "the Due Process
Clause does not require a preliminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness identification
when the identification was not procured under unnecessary suggestive circumstances arranged by law
enforcement." (Emphasis added.) 68
But the Lawson Court appropriately stresses, as a matter of state
evidence law, "there is no reason to
hinder the analysis of eyewitness
reliability with purposeless distinctions between suggestiveness and
other sources of unreliability." 69
Under Lawson, following a traditional evidence code model, once a
criminal defendant files a pre-trial
motion to exclude eyewitness identification evidence, the state, as the
proponent of the evidence, must
establish all preliminary facts necessary to establish the admissibility of

*
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the eyewitness evidence under the
equivalent of FRE 104.70 When an
issue raised in a pre-trial challenge to
the eyewitness evidence specifically
implicates issues under the equivalent of FRE 602 and 701, the state's
preliminary showing must include, at
a minimum, proof that the proffered
eyewitness has personal knowledge
of the matters to which the witness
will testify (FRE 602), and that any
identification is both rationally
based on the witness's first-hand
perceptions and helpful to the trier
of fact (FRE 701).71 If the state makes
this showing, then the burden shifts
to the defendant to establish under
the equivalent of FRE 403 72 that,
although the eyewitness evidence is
otherwise admissible, the probative
value of the evidence is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury.
The court can either suppress the
identification on that basis or fashion
an appropriate intermediate remedy
short of exclusion to cure the unfair
prejudice or other dangers attending
the use of that evidence. These "intermediate remedies" would include
motions in Ii mine that have frequently
been granted in identification
61. 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011).
62 . S059234.
63. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
64. In addition to reading the Henderson decision itself and the Special Master's Report, it
would extremely useful to read Chief Justice
Stuart Rabner's thoughtful reflections on the
decision making process that led to Henderson.
See Evaluating Eyewitness Identification Evidence
in the 21st Century, 87 NYU L. REV. 1249 (2013).
65. "System variables" refer to the circumstances surrounding the identification procedure itself that are generally within the control
of those administering the procedure. "Estimator" variables generally refer to characteristics
of the witness, the alleged perpetrator, and
the environmental conditions of the event that
cannot be manipulated or adjusted by state
actors . Lawson, Supra n. 61 at 17-18.
66. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 918.
67. See http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressre1/2012/pr120719a.htm. Last accessed June 3,
2013.
68. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S.Ct. 716, 730
(2012).
69. Supra n. 62, at 25.
70. http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule
_104, last accessed June 4, 2013.
71. See http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/
fre/rul e_602 and http://www.law.cornell.edu/
rules/fre/rule_701, last accessed June 4, 2013.
72 . http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/
rule_ 403, last accessed June 4, 2013.

cases.73 The decision whether to
admit, exclude, or fashion an appropriate intermediate remedy short of
exclusion is committed to the sound
exercise of the trial court's discretion.
This Lawson evidentiary code
approach makes eminent sense for at
least three reasons. First, as a purely
practical matter, the prosecution has
the best access to information as to
how identification procedures were
conducted and the circumstances
surrounding the observations of the
witness. The "due process" approach
that puts the burden on the defense
to prove suggestion without the
ability to depose the eyewitness or
those who administered the identification procedure is problematic and
results in unproductive sparring and
ill-informed motions.
Second, the evidence code
approach allows trial courts to identify factors that scientific research
shows substantially undermine the
reliability of eyewitness evidence
that can arise, even if unnecessarily
suggestive actions by state actors
never occur. This has the added
advantage of being logical: "A trial
court tasked with determining a
constitutional claim must necessarily assume that the evidence is
otherwise admissible; were it inadmissible on evidentiary grounds,
the court would never reach the
constitutional question. However, a
trial court tasked with considering
a question of evidentiary admissibility clearly cannot begin by assuming admissibility." 74 And finally, the
Lawson evidence code approach
treats eyewitness memory like malleable "trace evidence" that can be
contaminated by improper handling
and degraded by environmental
insults and extended storage time.

73. Such motions include precluding a witness
from testifying about certainty in court if a
confidence statement was not taken at the time
of the original identification. or the kind of jury
instructions that New Jersey has fashioned that
warn juries about the risk of miside ntification if
certain "sys tem variable" best practices are not
fo llowed, or certain "estimator" variables create
risks of misidentification, like cross-racial situations or "weapon focus."
74. ld.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
_ __,D.J.

ETHICAL RULE 3,8 ORDER FOR
THE DISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE
________, 20 __

The defendant has moved for an order under A.B.A. Rule 3.8 [and
other local ethical rules] requiring the prosecutor, in the language of
the ethical rule, to "make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate
the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense." In addition, Rule
3.8 requires that the prosecutor, in. connection with sentencing, "disclose to the defense and to [the Court] all unprivileged mitigating
information know to the prosecutor."
Defendant has specifically outlined examples of such information
relevant to the case at bar - on both fronts - information negating
.guilt as wen as information mitigating the offense. And the defendant
has listed the agencies and investig~tors likely to be in possession of
such information. Such information includes, but is not limited to,
the following [insert description of information].
The information that is the subject of the Defendant's motion fits
within the provisions of the ethical rule, as well as the Government's
constitutional obligations under Brady v. Maryland, and as such, the
Government is ORDERED to
a) produce such information described above to the defense within
xxx days of this order;
b) produce such additional information as (its within the government's continuing obligation to disclose Rule 3.8/ .Br.ad.y information.
The Government shall be given an opportunity to object to the provision of this information by filing an ex parte motion, outlining why
timely disclosure would endanger a witness or otherwise unfairly
prejudice the prosecution before trial, together with the relevant
Rule 3.8 materials for the court's in camera review. The parties are
on notice that willful and deliberate failure to comply with this order
is punishable by contempt.

SO ORDERED.
Date: _ _ __

,20_

Isl'

______U.S.D.C.
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This is not only a good legal analogy,
but fits the biological and cognitive
findings of neuroscientists as well as
experimental psychologists.
To be sure, more work needs to be
done, but the Henderson and Lawson
Courts have taken major steps
forward toward the development of
a robust judicial framework for the
assessment of eyewitness evidence
based on sound science. These decisions reflect judging at its best and
should be emulated. AJS's work in
this area should continue apace, providing the necessary data and potential reforms for judges, legislators,
and law enforcement to use.

Encourage Videotaping of
Interrogations, and Adopt an
Evidence Code Approach to the
Reliability of Confessions
The trace evidence analogy applies
with equal force to the issue of false
confessions-a leading cause of the
conviction of the innocent. Interrogations must be properly preserved
to prevent the "contamination" (the
inadvertent or deliberate feeding of
facts that only the real perpetrator
or the police would know) and the
"formatting" (suggestions by police
about narrative and motivation) of
a confession. Recent research from
wrongful conviction cases has demonstrated both the prevalence and
persuasive power of contaminated
and formatted false confession.75
The full electronic recording of an
interrogation is essential to accurate fact-finding about a confession's reliability. In the absence of
a full recording of the entire interrogation from start to finish, there
is simply no way for prosecutors,
judges, juries, and appellate courts
to detect whether police interrogators have contaminated/formatted
the suspect's false confession.
Eighteen states and the District of
Columbia now mandate videotaping of interrogations, and a number
of states initiated this practice
because the judiciary directly suggested it by either setting up an
advisory commission or issuing jury
instructions that an adverse inference should be drawn if an interro-
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gation were not videotaped. 76
But just as the adoption of best
practices in the eyewitness identification area must be married to a new
framework for evaluating evidence
in light of new scientific findings,
the same is true in the area of false
confessions. Scholars and scientific
experts have long urged the that
"constitutional" rule announced in
Colorado v. Connelly, 77 focusing just on
whether a confession is "voluntary,"
must be supplemented by a pre-trial
examination that examines the "reliability" of a confession. 78 Although
the best solution here would be
statutory fixes that mandate pretrial reliability hearings and suppression on that ground, advocates
and courts would be wise to undertake a reliability inquiry using an
evidence code approach similar
to the one adopted by the Oregon
Supreme Court in Lawson. 79 This
suggestion has been made before,
but new work by leading scholars in
the field is sure to build momentum
along these lines. 80 AJS and]udicature
could support these scholarly efforts
to bolster the case for the adoption

of mandatory video recording of all
confessions.
These four reforms top my list of
priorities for the criminal justice
system. Of course, there are many
other reforms that would alleviate case backlogs, create a more
fair and equitable justice system,
and increase public support for the
courts and the administration of
justice. However, adoption of these
four-a supported and effective
public defense system; routine issuance of ethical rule orders; and new
procedures to enhance reliability
of both eyewitness testimony and
confessions-would go a long way
toward those overall goals.

75. Sara Appleby et al., Po/ice-Induced Confessions: An Empirical Analysis of Their Content and
Impact, 19 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 111-128 (2011) .
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